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A PRESCRIPTION FOR AMERICA’S PRESCRIPTIONS
INTRODUCTION
While taking questions from the audience during a town hall in Nevada in
September 2019, presidential candidate Bernie Sanders was confronted by Navy
veteran John Weigel who had one topic on his mind: medical costs.1 Weigel
explained that he had been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease and had
accumulated over $139,000 in medical debt.2 After Sanders asked Weigel how
he planned to pay for these expenses, Weigel replied “I can’t. I can’t. I’m going
to kill myself.”3 The crowd fell silent as Sanders asked Weigel to wait for him
after the event so that he could connect the veteran with needed resources.4
Although the interaction gained headlines because of the veteran’s shocking
response, Weigel’s plight is far from uncommon. An estimated 137 million
Americans are saddled with medical debt due to the exorbitant prices of
prescription drugs.5 During the first six months of 2019, the price of more than
3,400 drugs increased an average of seventeen percent from the price just the
previous year.6 In 2015 alone, prescription drug spending within the United
States totaled about $457 billion.7 This number has continued to grow, and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is projecting average annual
increases of 6.7% through 2025.8
A major factor leading to the increase of drug prices is a provision in the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003
(“MMA”), which includes a noninterference clause prohibiting the federal
government from negotiating the price of prescription drugs with
pharmaceutical manufacturers.9 Supporters of the peculiar noninterference
clause opined that the free market system would ensure that drugs were sold at
1

Averi Harper, Veteran Who Contemplated Suicide Reunites With Bernie Sanders, ABC NEWS (Dec. 9,

2019).
2

Id.
Id.
4
Annie Grayer and Veronica Stracqualursi, Bernie Sanders Shares Personal Moment With
Veteran Struggling With $139,000 in Health Care Debt, CNN N EWS (Sept. 14, 2019).
5
Lorie Konish, 137 Million Americans Are Struggling With Medical Debt. Here’s What to Know if You
Need Some Relief, CNBC (Nov. 10, 2019).
6
Aimee Picchi, Drug Prices in 2019 Are Surging, With Hikes at 5 Times Inflation, CBS N EWS
(Jul. 1, 2019).
7
Ed Silverman, CMS Official Says Drug Costs Are ‘Unsustainable’ and There Are ‘Too Many’ Bad
Actors, STAT (NOV. 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/07/medicare-medicaid-drug-prices/.
8
Id.
9
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117
Stat. 2066 (2003).
3
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reasonable prices and requiring manufacturers to engage in price negotiations
would suppress research and development (R&D).10 However, prescription
drugs are distinct from other products for which the competitive market can
determine a reasonable price for two major reasons. First, U.S. patent law allows
manufacturers to monopolize the prescription drug market, thereby decreasing
the competition.11 Second, Americans need their prescription medicines for their
well-being, creating an inequality of bargaining power with individuals forced
to pay prices much higher than what is reasonable or forgo treatment.12
Recognizing the need to reform the regulatory landscape and repeal the MMA’s
noninterference provision, democratic and republican members of Congress
have introduced legislation that would allow the federal government to negotiate
with manufacturers and impose price caps on prescription drugs.13 Yet, many of
the proposals struggle with how to establish a “reasonable drug price” and how
to decide which drugs to subject to price caps, which is necessary to balance
drug innovation with ensuring access.14
Using a reasonable drug price scheme to reduce prescription drug prices is
not a novel idea; in the past twenty years, the United Kingdom, India, and
Germany have all established legislation that guides the government to
determine a reasonable selling price for prescription drugs.15 Because the United
Kingdom, India, and Germany established such different reasonable pricing
schemes, the United States can learn which policies and implementation tactics
have been successful, and just as important, which regulatory mechanisms to

10
Rexford E. Santerre, John A. Vernon & Carmelo Giaccotto, The Impact of Indirect Government
Controls on U.S. Drug Prices and R&D, 26 CATO J. 143, 145 (2006).
11
See James T. O’Reilly, Prescription Pricing & Monopoly Extension: Elderly Drug Users Lose the Shell
Game of Post-Patent Exclusivity, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 413, 413 (2002) (“The simplest explanation [of a drug
monopoly] might be offered in basic terms: [a] patent gives the inventor a . . . monopoly, after which time any
other marketer can sell the same product.”).
12
See Paul J. Zwier, High Prices in the U.S. for Life-Saving Drugs: Collective Bargaining Through Tort
Law, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 203, 205–12 (2016).
13
See e.g., The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. (2019);
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S.
102, 116th Cong. (2019).
14
See e.g., Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019).
15
See e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE, PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE STATUTORY SCHEME
TO CONTROL THE COSTS OF BRANDED HEALTH SERVICE MEDICINES 2018 (Dec. 2019) (consultation response),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/761015/cons
ultation-response-statutory-scheme-to-control-costs-of-branded-health-service-medicines.pdf (UK) [hereinafter
U.K. Statutory Scheme]; T.V. Padma, India Court Ruling Upholds Access to Cheaper, Generic Drugs, Scientific
American, NATURE MAG. (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/india-court-rulingupholds-access-to-cheaper-generic-drugs/; Richard Kingham & Joanna Wheeler, Government Regulation of
Pricing and Reimbursement of Prescription Medicines: Results of a Recent Multi-Country Review, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 101, 105 (2009).
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avoid. This Comment examines five federal proposals aimed to reduce
prescription drug prices through implementing a reasonable pricing scheme.
This Comment then argues that the United States should leverage lessons
learned from the United Kingdom, India, and Germany to establish a scheme
that subjects both name brand and generic drugs to a reasonable price. The
reasonable price should be determined by referencing the price of similar drugs
in other countries, factoring in the value that the drug adds to the prescription
drug market, and considering how much the manufacturers have invested in
R&D.
This Comment is divided into four sections. The first section provides an
overview of the current prescription drug regulatory system in the United States
and explains why federal legislation is necessary to address the exorbitant prices
of prescription drugs. The second section explores five proposals introduced to
reduce prescription drug prices. The five proposals were selected for
examination because they differ as to the factors used to determine the
reasonability of a drug price and as to which drugs are subjected to reasonable
price caps. The third section explains the reasonable drug pricing schemes
implemented in the United Kingdom, India, and Germany. The fourth section
explains how the United States can leverage the lessons learned from the
aforementioned countries to recognize strengths and weaknesses in the recently
proposed legislation. The fourth section argues that the Lower Drug Costs Now
Act has the most promise in reducing prescription drug prices by combining a
reference-based and value-based system, while continuing to incentivize R&D.
I.

MAKING SENSE OF THE EXORBITANT PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES

The high costs of prescription drugs have dominated the political arena, with
both presidential and congressional candidates promising to reduce drug prices
as part of their 2020 campaign platforms.16 In 2019, spending on prescription
drugs in the United States was the highest to date.17 However, the debate of how
much regulatory power the government should have over the prescription drug
market is not new—attempts to use federal legislation to lower drug prices have
been prevalent since the 1980s.18 After recognizing that some manufacturers and
drug distributers monopolized certain pockets of the prescription drug market,
16
Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats Who Flipped Seats in 2018 Have a 2020 Playbook: Focus on Drug
Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019).
17
Matej Mikulic, Prescription Drug Expenditure in The U.S. 1960-2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184914/prescription-drug-expenditures-in-the-us-since-1960/.
18
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
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Congress passed legislation with the goal of increasing competition by
facilitating the introduction of generic drugs into the market.19 Yet, even with
the number of generic drugs in the market at an all-time high,20 the price of
prescription drugs has not decreased.21 Moreover, legislation passed in recent
years that aimed to increase the number of American’s with health insurance did
little to address the price individuals were actually paying for prescription
drugs.22 Because of the failure on the federal level to decrease drug prices, states
tried passing legislation to address the high price of prescription drugs but
encountered issues with opponents claiming Commerce Clause and First
Amendment violations.23 The lack of success on the federal and state levels in
reducing drug prices highlights the need for federal legislation mandating
pharmaceutical companies sell drugs at reasonable prices.
A. The Current Prescription Drug Regulatory Landscape in the United States
In the early 1980s, congress attempted to incentivize manufacturers to create
generic drugs as a way to reduce drug prices.24 The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act (“the Act”), allowed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
fast track regulatory approval of generic drugs.25 The Hatch-Waxman Act
amended the former Abbreviated New Drug Application process26 by allowing
generic manufacturers to use already published clinical data.27 The HatchWaxman Act changed the pharmaceutical market significantly by increasing the
number of generic drugs on the market.28 In the early 1980s, only thirty-five
percent of top-selling drugs had any generic competitors following patent
19

See generally id.
Press Release, FDA, Statement on Continued Progress Enhancing Patient Access to High-quality, Lowcost Generic Drugs (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-continuedprogress-enhancing-patient-access-high-quality-low-cost-generic-drugs.
21
Mikulic, supra note 17.
22
Michael Callam, Who Can Afford It: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Failure to
Regulate Excessive Cost-Sharing or Prescription Biologic Drugs, 27 J.L. & HEALTH 99, 116–17 (2014).
23
See Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 877 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2018); Tara Sklar,
Affordability Boards – The States’ New Fix for Pricing, NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1301, 1301–03 (Oct. 3, 2019).
24
See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.
25
Id.
26
The former Abbreviated New Drug Application process required companies marketing generic drugs
to file information to support the safety and efficacy of the drug which was a costly and lengthy process. Garth
Boehm, Lixin Yao, Liang Hana, & Qiang Zheng, Development of The Generic Drug Industry in The US After
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, DRUG PATENT WATCH, https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/developmentof-the-generic-drug-industry-in-the-us-after-the-hatch-waxman-act-of-1984/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
27
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984).
28
Boehm et al., supra note 26.
20
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expiration.29 In 2012, generic drugs were estimated to account for eighty-four
percent of dispensed prescriptions.30 Yet, critics of the Act maintain that too
many loopholes exist, allowing pharmaceutical companies to extend their patent
exclusivity which results in the delay of generic formulations.31 In addition to
existing loopholes, some argue that the requirements for manufacturers to
demonstrate that their new drug is interchangeable with the product already on
the market, thereby qualifying as a “generic” which lowers the approval process
threshold, are quite demanding.32 More concerning, however, is that the Act
created a tiered scheme of additional market exclusivity provisions which
extended the length of market exclusivity for some manufacturers.33 In fact, the
tiered scheme led some critics to declare that the true winner of the HatchWaxman Act was the pharmaceutical industry because of the additional
monopoly periods.34 Further, the Act catalyzed the prevalence of “Pay-forDelay” schemes penetrating the market.35 A Pay-for-Delay scheme allows the
company which invented the drug to monopolize the market while imposing
high drug prices.36 Such agreements have led drug manufacturers to continue to
monopolize the market long after their period of market exclusivity, thus
counteracting Congress’s purpose in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act.37
Recognizing the need to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to achieve the goal
of reducing drug prices by increasing generics, Congress passed the MMA in
2003.38 While the Hatch-Waxman Act granted the first generic drug entering the

29
Wendy H. Schact, and John R. Thomas, Hatch-Waxman Act: A Quarter Century Later, CONG. RSCH.
SERV. (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files.
30
Boehm et al., supra note 26.
31
Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman, 11 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 47, 48 (2016).
32
Abdulrazag S. Al-Jazariri, Sakra Blhareth, Iyad S. Eqtefan, & Saleh A. Al-Suwayeh, Brand and
Generic Medications: Are They Interchangeable?, ANN SAUDI MED. (2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih/gov
(“Bioequivalence is defined as ‘the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active
ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at
the site of drug action.’”).
33
James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 478–79 (1986).
34
Id.
35
Pay-for-Delay settlements are “a strategic tactic in which brand-named drug manufacturers induce
generic companies to agree to stay off the market by sharing portions of their monopoly profits.” Robin C.
Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 249
(2019).
36
Gabriele Spina Ali, Sweetening a Bitter Pill: Of Drug Prices, Drug Delays and Data Exclusivity, 12
ASIA PACIFIC J. HEALTH L. & ETHICS 1, 2 (2019).
37
See Feldman & Misra, supra note 35, at 255.
38
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117
Stat. 2066 (2003).
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market a 180-day exclusivity period which blocked the approval of other generic
formulations during this time,39 the MMA sought to provide more stringent
requirements for generic drug companies to receive such exclusivity.40
Prior to the MMA, a manufacturer was designated as the first applicant by
filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).41 The MMA changed
this by designating the first applicant to be any generic drug approved on the
“first day,” meaning that if multiple generic drugs were approved for the first
time on the same day, they would share this 180-day period of market
exclusivity.42 The MMA also added a forfeiture clause, which provided that an
applicant forfeits their market exclusivity period if it fails to market its product
either within seventy-five days of receiving FDA approval or thirty months after
ANDA submission.43 Though Congress passed the MMA to expand access to
costly pharmaceuticals for older adults, in truth it exacerbated the issue of
increasing drug prices due to its noninterference clause.44 The noninterference
clause bars the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from
negotiating with drug manufacturers and distributors on prices for Medicare
beneficiaries.45 In addition, the MMA prohibits the government from
implementing a pricing scheme to regulate drug prices.46 Therefore, to give the
government the authority to mandate that pharmaceutical companies sell
prescription drugs at a reasonable price, Congress must pass legislation to amend
the MMA.
Though many healthcare advocates rejoiced in the eventual enactment of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),47 it did little to control the
actual price of prescription drugs.48 The ACA required that healthcare plans
covered essential health benefits, which includes prescription drugs.49 Yet,

39
Guidance for Industry, HHS, FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) 1, 12 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/102650/download
[hereinafter Guidance for Industry].
40
Id.
41
Barry J. Marenberg, Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act Following “Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,” 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 277 (June 2004).
42
Guidance for Industry, supra note 39 at 4.
43
Aaron F. Barkoff, Understanding the 180-Day Forfeiture Provisions of The MMA, Presentation at
Generic Drugs Summit, (June 19, 2008).
44
Karen M. Wieghaus, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003:
The Wrong Prescription for Our Nation’s Senior Citizens, 11 CONN. INS. L. J. 401, 402 (2004).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 403.
47
See generally Patient Prot. & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
48
Callam, supra note 22.
49
ACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022; 45 C.F.R. § 156.110.
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without regulating the actual cost of these prescription drugs, private health
insurance plans recoup these high drug prices by increasing premiums and
insurance costs.50 In 2018, high drug prices were estimated to account for 23.3
cents of each dollar spent on an insurance premium.51 While some consumers
pay for the high cost of drugs in this indirect way, the ACA left many individuals
to pay for prescription drug costs directly out of pocket either because they
remain uninsured or because of the “grandfathering in” exception.52 In the
majority of states adopting the Medicaid expansion, only individuals earning up
to 138 percent of the federal poverty level are eligible for Medicaid.53 Therefore,
individuals earning over $17,236 who are ineligible for Medicaid must rely
either on their employer for health insurance, which often requires a full-time
job, or they must pay for their own private health insurance, or remain
uninsured.54 Those remaining uninsured fall into what is known as the “coverage
gap” and are forced to pay for prescription drugs directly out of pocket, which
can result in medical debt or may result in them not receiving the drugs that they
need to live healthy lives. 55 More concerning, in the fifteen states that have not
adopted Medicaid expansion, parents earning forty-one percent of the federal
poverty level are eligible for Medicaid but non-parents remain ineligible.56
Many individuals are unable to afford their prescription medications because of
this lack of coverage.57 Additionally, the ACA grandfathered in health insurance
plans in existence prior to 2010.58 This allowed some plans not to cover
prescription drug costs, therefore requiring individuals to pay those costs out of
pocket.59
Despite the steps that Congress has taken in the past forty-five years to
decrease excessive medical spending, U.S. prescription drug spending has

50
Sara Heath, High Drug Prices Account for One-Quarter of Patient Insurance Costs, PATIENT
ENGAGEMENT HIT (May 23, 2018), https://patientengagementhit.com/news/high-drug-prices-account-for-onequarter-of-patient-insurance-costs.
51
Id.
52
Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security after the Affordable Care Act, 92
N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1496 (2014).
53
Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Levels for Children, Pregnant Women, and
Adults, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/where-arestates-today-medicaid-and-chip/ [hereinafter Where Are States Today?]
54
Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera, and Anthony Damico; The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in
States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 7 (Jan. 2020).
55
See id.
56
Where Are States Today?, supra note 53.
57
See Silverman, supra note 7.
58
Hoffman, supra note 52.
59
Id.
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continued to increase at rapid rates in the past four decades.60 In 2019, an
estimated one in four Americans reported having a difficult time affording their
medicine.61 The Hatch-Waxman Act and the MMA sought to lower prescription
drug pricing by increasing competition within the market.62 Similarly, the ACA
sought to provide health insurance to more Americans so they would not have
to pay for medical costs directly out of pocket.63 However, these acts did little
to ensure that pharmaceutical companies and drug distributers market drugs at a
reasonable price.64
Because increasing both the number of generic drugs on the market and the
number of individuals with health insurance has proven unsuccessful in
lowering drug prices,65 the United States should consider directly regulating
prescription drug prices. In the absence of federal legislation, states have tried
to implement their own reasonable price schemes that appear promising but are
subject to Commerce Clause and First Amendment violation claims.66 The
challenges on the state level further emphasize the need for congressional action.

B. Barriers To Implementing Reasonable Drug Price Schemes on the State
Level
States, perhaps due to ineffective federal legislation to control drug prices,
have tried to enact legislation at the state level to mitigate excessive drug prices
for their citizens.67 In 2019, a record number of states passed laws addressing
prescription drugs, with thirty-three states enacting fifty-one laws.68 States have
faced significant roadblocks in successfully passing legislation because of
Commerce Clause challenges to state power.69
60
Rabah Kamal, Cynthia Cox, & Daniel McDermott, What Are The Recent and Forecasted Trend in
Prescription Drug Spending?, PETERSON-KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.
healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/#item-nominaland-inflation-adjusted-increase-in-rx-spending_2017.
61
Id.
62
See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
63
See generally ACA § 1302,42 U.S.C. § 18022; 45 C.F.R. § 156.110.
64
See Mikulic, supra note 17.
65
See id.
66
See, e.g., Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 877 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2018); Sklar, supra
note 23, at 1301, 1302–03.
67
See e.g., Ass’n for Accessible Medicines, 877 F.3d 664, 674; Sklar, supra note 23, at 1301.
68
Steven Findlay, To Reel In Drug Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://khn.org/news/
states-pass-record-number-of-laws-to-reel-in-drug-prices/.
69
The Commerce Clause grants the United States Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
Rachel Sachs, Prescription Drug Policy: The Year in Review, And The Year Ahead, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Jan. 3,
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In 2017, Maryland passed An Act concerning Public Health—Essential OffPatent or Generic Drugs—Price Gouging—Prohibition (“Price Gouging Act”).70
The Price Gouging Act prohibited price gouging for all essential off-patent and
generic drugs defined as “an unconscionable increase in the price of a
prescription drug.”71 The Maryland legislature passed this Act in response to
Turing Pharmaceuticals acquiring the rights to Daraprim, a drug used to treat
severe parasitic infections, and subsequently raising the price from $13.50 to
$175.00 per dose overnight.72 The Price Gouging Act angered manufacturers
and wholesale distributors who subsequently brought suit challenging its
constitutionality.73
In Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that Maryland’s Price Gouging Act was unconstitutional because it violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause by regulating the price of drug transactions that
occur outside of Maryland.74 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wynn critiqued
the majority’s interpretation of the statute, reasoning that the statute only sought
to regulate the price of drugs that are sold within Maryland.75 The court’s
decision that such legislation was in violation of the Commerce Clause was a
win for Big Pharma and set a precedent for questioning the constitutionality of
similar state legislation.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA),
which represents biopharmaceutical research companies, filed a complaint
following a 2017 California law to increase drug price transparency.76 The law
requires drug manufacturers provide a sixty-day written notice of drug price
increases for the government’s review and approval for drugs with wholesale
acquisition costs of greater than $40 when the price increases are above sixteen
percent.77 The notification must include a statement indicating whether the price
increase follows an improvement to the drug.78 The complaint alleged that the
Bill violates the Commerce Clause because it regulates commerce beyond

2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190103.183538/full/.
70
H.D. 631, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017).
71
Id.
72
Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1748, 1748–49 (2019) (providing
background information on the events leading up to the Act).
73
Id.
74
Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 877 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2018).
75
Id. at 678–79.
76
Rebecca E. Wolitz, California’s Drug Pricing Transparency Bill SB-17, STAN. L. SCH. LAW &
BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Sep. 21, 2019).
77
Id.
78
Id.
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California and imposes unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce.79
Additionally, the complaint contends that the statute violates the First
Amendment by forcing manufacturers to “speak” about drug prices, and violates
Due Process because it is unconstitutionally vague.80 The action was brought in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California and was dismissed
without prejudice for a lack of standing.81
Though state legislation to address prescription drug prices continues to
increase, there is only so much states can accomplish without federal action or
at least, support.82 In 2019, Colorado, Florida, Maine, and Vermont all passed
legislation establishing programs to import less expensive prescription drugs
from Canada.83 However, federal law requires that states gain approval from
HHS before implementing such a program, leading many to believe it could be
years before any of these programs go into effect.84
Even if state legislation that aims to reduce drug prices can get past the
hurdle of being accused of exceeding state powers, the issue of determining a
reasonable sale price remains. If federal law mandates that prescription drugs
are sold at a certain price, pharmaceutical companies and drug distributers will
be forced to abide by this price or risk losing the U.S. market. Conversely,
implementing a fragmented state approach may allow pharmaceutical
companies to select those states in which they wish to sell their drugs, leaving
some U.S. consumers unable to continue their current medications, particularly
those enrolled in state health programs.
Maryland could very well serve as an example of how states can determine
and mandate reasonable drug prices, as a second law recently passed may be a
harbinger of what’s to come in drug-pricing legislation.85 In 2019, Maryland
passed a second law aimed to reduce drug prices through creating a PrescriptionDrug Affordability Board.86 The Affordability Board will have the authority to
set lower prices for both patented and generic prescription drugs that it feels

79

Id.
David C. Gibbons & Alan Kirschenbaum, PhRMA’s Complaint Against Enforcement of California
Drug Pricing Transparency Bill SB 17 Dismissed, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
2018/09/phrmas-complaint-against-enforcement-of-california-drug-pricing-transparency-bill-sb-17-dismissed/.
81
Id.
82
Findlay, supra note 68.
83
Id.
84
Sarah Owermohle, Sarah Karlin-Smith, & Gary Fineout, Trump Plan Would Allow States to Import
Drugs From Canada, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2019).
85
Sklar, supra note 23, at 1302.
86
Id. at 1301.
80
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have unjustifiably high prices or price spikes.87 The Affordability Board is
authorized to review potential unjustifiable costs or price hikes for new brand
name prescriptions with a cost of $30,000 per year, as well as treatment cost or
price hikes exceeding $3,000 or more per year or course of treatment.88 The
Affordability Board can also review generic prescriptions that increase in price
by $3,000 or 200 percent within one year.89 To deter pharmaceutical companies
from setting prices just below the threshold warranting review, the legislation
also gives the Affordability Board the authority to review “any prescription drug
that creates affordability challenges to the Maryland health care system,
including [for] patients.”90 The legislation sets the factors the Affordability
Board must use to determine whether the drug is “affordable” or reasonable,
which includes a review of the entire supply chain.91 Though this legislation may
serve as a model for other states wishing to implement similar programs, two
potential loopholes exist.92 First, the Affordability Board will only have the
authority to regulate these prices for drugs paid for through state health programs
thereby leading to potential price hikes for private insurers to recoup lost profits.
Second, the reference point suggested in the legislation to measure affordability
is to look at the price of similar drugs sold in the state, rather than other
developed economies, which may only reduce prices to a certain degree.
The need for federal legislation to address drug prices directly is illustrated
in the following two ways: (1) the lack of success the federal government has
had despite facilitating the entry of generic drugs into the market and increasing
the number of Americans with health insurance; and (2) the precarious legality
of state governments regulating prescription drug prices. By repealing the
MMA’s noninterference clause and allowing the government to mandate that
pharmaceutical companies sell drugs at reasonable prices, the price Americans
pay for prescription drugs will decrease. However, this would not take away the
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to invest in drug innovation.
Five introduced federal proposals all aim to reduce drug prices by allowing
the government to set a reasonable price on prescription drugs.93 However, these
87
Summary of the 2019 Prescription Drug Affordability Board HB768, HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (Apr. 4,
2019) https://mmcp.health.maryland.gov/Documents/MMAC/2019/04_April/Summary%20of%20Prescription
%20Drug%20Affordability%20Board.pdf.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
In 2019 a total of eight states introduced similar bills that would create an entity to review prescription
drug prices. So far Maine is the only other state that has passed the legislation. Sklar, supra note 23, at 1302.
93
See The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. (2019);
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five proposals all emphasize different factors for determining a reasonable price
and subject a different set of drugs to the suggested pricing scheme.94 This
highlights the importance of identifying the best factors to strike the balance
between ensuring drugs are affordable through reasonable price caps while still
incentivizing drug innovation.
II. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO DECREASE DRUG PRICES THROUGH
REASONABLE PRICING SCHEMES
The idea of allowing the government to intervene in determining the price
of prescription drugs may seem antithetical to America’s valued free market
system. Yet, in reality, the prescription drug market can be viewed as lacking
competition which has allowed drug prices to increase.95 Several proposals were
introduced in Congress between 2018 and 2019 aimed to reduce drug prices by
authorizing the government to regulate the price at which pharmaceutical
companies can sell prescription drugs.96 This Comment focuses on the strengths
and weaknesses of five proposals that vary in how they guide the government in
determining a reasonable drug price and which drugs the government is
authorized to subject to reasonable price caps. Though the proposals may
implement different strategies, the issue of determining a reasonable price to
ensure affordability, while still incentivizing R&D, manifests in each of these
bills.
A. The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act
The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act (“Pricing Reduction Act”)—
which advanced out of the Senate Finance Committee in July 2019 and was
introduced by Senator Chuck Grassley [R-IA] in September 2019—seeks to
reduce prescription drug prices by requiring that price increases are reasonable.97
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S.
102, 116th Cong. (2019); Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Press Release,
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, H.R. 3 – the Lower Drug Costs Now Act (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.
speaker.gov/LowerDrugCosts [hereinafter Nancy Pelosi Press Release].
94
See generally The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. (2019);
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S.
102, 116th Cong. (2019); Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Nancy Pelosi Press
Release, supra note 93.
95
High Drug Prices & Monopoly, OPEN MARKETS INST., https://openmarketsinstitute.org/explainer/
high-drug-prices-and-monopoly/.
96
See PAID Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th
Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019); Affordable Drug Manufacturing
Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Nancy Pelosi Press Release, supra note 93.
97
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. § 128 (2019).
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The legislation imposes penalties on manufacturers if the market price of drugs
covered under Medicare Part D98 increases at a faster rate than inflation.99 As
currently proposed, the Pricing Reduction Act would require HHS to determine
whether the price of a drug increased faster than inflation through the use of
routine audits.100 Manufacturers who are found to have increased their price
above inflation and have not submitted a required price justification to explain
the price hike are subject to civil monetary penalties of $10,000 per day.101
Additionally, the Pricing Reduction Act caps out-of-pocket spending at $3,100
a year for Medicare beneficiaries.102
B. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018
The Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act (ADMA), introduced by Senator
Elizabeth Warren [D-MA], aims to increase drug competition, reduce the cost
of prescription drugs to government health programs and general consumers,
and increase patient access to affordable drugs.103 The ADMA would establish
an Office of Drug Manufacturing within HHS that is responsible for either
manufacturing a particular drug or entering into an agreement with a private
company to manufacture a particular drug to reduce the drug’s price.104
For a drug to be subject to the ADMA, it must fall within one of the
following categories: a drug for which the patent has expired; a drug for which
the period of regulatory exclusivity has expired; a drug that is not being
marketed in the United States; or a drug that is being marketed in the United
States by fewer than three manufacturers and (1) has experienced a price
increase; (2) is included in the drug shortage list under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act; (3) is listed by the World Health Organization as an essential
medicine; or (4) is determined by the HHS Secretary to have an average
manufacturer price that is a barrier to patient access.105
The ADMA serves as an example of legislation that, while seeking to reduce
the price of prescription drugs through determining a reasonable price, falls short

98
A federal-government health program that helps cover the price of drugs deemed essential. Drug
coverage (Part D), MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coverage-part-d.
99
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. §160 (2019).
100
See generally Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019).
101
Id. § 1182l(f)(1).
102
Id. §121(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII).
103
Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018, S. 3775, 115th Cong. §§ 310B(a)(2)(A)–(C).
104
Id. §§ 310B(a)(4)(A)(i)–(vi).
105
Id. § 310B(a)(7)(e)(1).
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of providing a comprehensive list of factors for consideration.106 Though the
ADMA does not require HHS to determine the “reasonable price” before
manufacturing the drug or entering into an agreement to ensure its
manufacturing, it does require the Secretary to engage in a fair price analysis to
determine how to price the government-manufactured drug.107 The factors for
such a determination include the impact of price on patient access to the drug;
the cost of the drug to government health care programs; the cost of the
government’s manufacturing of the drug; the administrative costs of operating
the manufacturing office; the cost to manufacture the drug; and the impact of
price on market competition for the applicable drug.108
C. The We Protect American Investment in Drugs Act
The We Protect American Investment in Drugs Act (“We PAID Act”),
introduced by Senator Chris Van Hollen [D-Md.] and Rick Scott [R-Fla.] in July
2019, aims to “ensure that the prices of drugs developed using federally funded
research, [such as the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease
Control grants,] are set at reasonable levels.”109 This legislation authorizes the
National Academy of Medicine (NAM), under HHS guidance, to develop a
framework for determining the reasonable cost of a new drug when R&D is
supported by federal funding.110
The legislation proposes six factors the NAM should consider when
developing the guidance, including: (1) the affordability of the drug across wide
market segments; (2) the federal government’s investment into development; (3)
the manufacturer’s R&D costs; (4) the price of the drug in similar countries; (5)
the estimated global and domestic sales; and (6) the expenditures by public
payers.111 Further, the reasonable drug price analysis must be determined in time
for a reasonable price to take effect in the product’s second year on the
market.112 Penalties for not abiding by the determined reasonable cost include
loss of market exclusivity and ineligibility for future licensing agreements for

106

See generally Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018, S. 3775, 115th Cong.
Id. §§ 310B(a)(4)(A)(iv), (4)(B).
108
Id. § 310B (a)(4)(B).
109
Press Release, Chris Van Hollen U.S. Senator For Maryland, Van Hollen, Scott Introduce Landmark
Legislation To Address Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Costs (July 31, 2019), https://www.vanhollen.senate.
gov/news/press-releases/van-hollen-scott-introduce-landmark-legislation-to-address-skyrocketingprescription-drug-costs [hereinafter Scott Introduce Landmark Legislation].
110
The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2019).
111
Id. §§ 4(a)(1)(A)–(J).
112
Id. § 4(a)(3).
107
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patented technology.113 Additionally, if the manufacturer’s launch price in the
first year is fifty percent higher than the determined reasonable price, the drug
manufacturer is subject to a civil monetary penalty.114 This penalty is assessed
using the launch price of the drug multiplied by the number of doses sold in the
United States during the first year on the market.115
D. The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act
The Prescription Drug Price Relief Act (“Price Relief Act”), introduced by
Senator Bernie Sanders [I-VT] in January 2019, would require HHS to
determine whether any brand name drug is excessively priced through the use
of a reference-based pricing system.116 A reference-based pricing system
requires that similar medicines are placed into groups and the “prices of these
drugs are then compared to the prices for the same drugs in select international
markets and set accordingly.”117 In the Price Relief Act, a price is considered
excessive if the domestic average manufacturing price exceeds the median price
for the drug in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan.118 If
the pricing information is unavailable in at least three of the aforementioned
countries, the price is considered excessive if it is higher than reasonable in light
of specified factors.119 The factors include the cost of the drug, the value of the
drug to patients, the manufacturer’s revenue, and the size of the affected patient
population, 120 but there is no clear guidance on how to weigh these factors. If
any such drug is excessively priced, HHS must (1) void any government-granted
exclusivity; (2) issue open, nonexclusive licenses for the drugs; and (3) expedite
the review of corresponding applications for generic drugs.121 However, the
control mechanisms established through the Price Relief Act are applicable only
to name brand drugs, not to generic drugs.122

113

Id. § 6(b).
Id. § 6(b)(5).
115
Id. §§ 6(b)(1), (5).
116
Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S. 102, 116th Cong.
117
Marie Salter, Reference Pricing: An Effective Model for the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 35 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 413, 416 (2015).
118
Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S. 102, 116th Cong. §§ 2(b)(1)(A)–(B).
119
Id. § 2(b)(2).
120
Id. § 2(b)(2).
121
Id. § 3(a)(1), (2).
122
See generally Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S. 102, 116th Cong.
114
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E. Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act
The Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (Lower Drug Costs
Now Act) was introduced in September 2019 and passed in the House in
December 2019.123 The bill seeks to regulate drug prices by allowing CMS to
negotiate prices for certain drugs. This amends the previously enacted MMA
noninterference clause that prohibits HHS from directly negotiating with drug
companies on prices.124
The bill provides a comprehensive framework to guide the government in
determining a reasonable drug price, referred to as the “maximum fair price,” by
requiring that the government consider: (1) the drug’s cost, which includes its
R&D costs and the extent to which the manufacturer has recouped this cost as
well as production and distribution costs; (2) the value the drug adds to the
pharmaceutical market through analyzing its therapeutic advancement compared
to existing therapeutic alternatives; and (3) the price of the drug in Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.125 This legislation
is unique because it sets firm guidance on how to take a reference point into
account by mandating that the drug price negotiated does not exceed 120 percent
of the average price in the comparable countries.126
In addition to a robust framework for determining a reasonable drug price,
the negotiated price would apply to drugs covered by Medicare Part D and
private insurers.127 Moreover, the legislation will require the 250 highest-priced
drugs, and all forms of insulin, be subject to a negotiated maximum price.128
Furthermore, a key strategy behind the bill is to reinvest the billions of
dollars the government saves by spending less on prescription drug prices on
researching new breakthrough treatments and to provide a comprehensive
prescriptive framework for determining a reasonable price and subjecting a

123
See Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019) (as introduced to
Senate, Jan. 10, 2019 and passed by Senate, Dec. 12, 2019).
124
Juliette Cubanski et al., What’s the Latest on Medicare Drug Price Negotiations?, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/whats-the-latest-on-medicare-drug-pricenegotiations/.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Nicole Rapfogel, Maura Calysn, & Emily Gee, House Bill Could Lower Patients’ Prescription Drug
Spending by Thousands of Dollars, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/healthcare/news/2019/12/09/478380/house-bill-lower-patients-prescription-drug-spending-thousandsdollars/.
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diverse set of drugs to this analysis.129 Though individuals are concerned that
the legislation may disincentivize pharmaceutical companies from investing in
R&D, in reality, even with the status quo of exorbitant drug prices, R&D has not
improved in recent years.130 Nine out of ten big pharmaceutical companies in
the United States, spend more on marketing and sales than on R&D.131 In fact,
drug innovation is less reliant on big pharmaceutical companies than many
claim—notably, every new drug approved between 2010 through 2016 was
funded by government entities using at least some amount of tax-payer
money.132
Though these five proposals all aim to reduce the cost of prescription drug
prices by authorizing the government to intervene when prices for certain drugs
are not reasonable, the proposals differ as to how a reasonable price should be
determined and which drugs should be subject to reasonable price caps.133 The
Pricing Reduction Act, introduced by Senator Chuck Grassley, only authorizes
the government to determine whether a price increase is reasonable, rather than
whether the drug price itself is reasonable, using the rate of inflation as a
guide.134 Only drugs paid for by Medicare Part D are subject to the scheme. 135
The ADMA, introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren, is unique in that it
authorizes the government to manufacture certain drugs that HHS determines
has a price that creates a barrier to patient access.136 The We PAID Act,
introduced by Senators Chris Van Hollen and Rick Scott, utilizes a referencebased pricing system, listing the price of the drugs in other countries as a factor
for considering a drug’s reasonable price. 137 However, the act focuses on those
drugs for which the government has funded R&D costs, leaving many drugs

129

Nancy Pelosi Press Release, supra note 93.
See Ana Swanson, Big Pharmaceutical Companies Are Spending Far More on Marketing Than
Research, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2015).
131
Id.
132
Alexander Zaitchik, Taxpayers—Not Big Pharma—Have Funded the Research Behind Every New
Drug Since 2010, OTHER98 (2018), https://other98.com/taxpayers-fund-pharma-research-development/.
Compare Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Gets $2 Billion Boost in Final 2019 Spending Bill, SCIENCE MAG. (Sep. 14, 2018,
9:55 AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/09/nih-gets-2-billion-boost-final-2019-spending-bill ($39.1
billion in taxpayer money), with Research & Development, PHRMA: ADVOCACY, https://www.phrma.org/
advocacy/research-development (last visited July 20, 2020) ($79.6 billion in PhRMA member money).
133
See generally The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. (2019);
Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S.
102, 116th Cong. (2019); Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Nancy Pelosi Press
Release, supra note 93.
134
See generally Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019).
135
See generally id.
136
Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(C)(ii)(III)(aa) (2018).
137
The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (PAID) Act, S. 2387, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(H) (2019).
130
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outside of the scheme.138 The Price Relief Act, introduced by Senator Bernie
Sanders, has a robust framework for determining the reasonable price of a drug,
using both the manufacturing price in other countries and the value of the drug
to patients.139 This legislation, however, only applies to brand name drugs, not
generic drugs.140 The last proposal discussed, the Lower Drug Costs Now Act,
first introduced by Speaker Pelosi, requires the government consider the price
of similar drugs in other countries, the therapeutic value the drug adds to the
existing market, and the R&D invested into the drug.141 This legislation is unique
in that it: (1) subjects the 250 highest-priced drugs to the scheme, and (2)
requires that the reasonable drug price determined applies to drugs paid for by
federal health insurance programs and private insurance companies.142
Though a majority of Americans support the idea of the government
regulating prescription drug prices, the differences in these proposals
demonstrate that Congress has no clear vision on the best way for the
government to determine a reasonable drug price.143 Fortunately, allowing the
government to regulate the prescription drug market by implementing a
reasonable pricing scheme is not new, as foreign governments have already done
this.144 Therefore, the United States can look to the successes and challenges
other countries have had in implementation to determine how best to establish a
reasonable drug price scheme.
III. REASONABLE DRUG PRICING SCHEMES IMPLEMENTED IN
FOREIGN STATES
The implementation of a reasonable price mandate to control the cost of
prescription drugs is not new. As a result, the United States is at an advantage in
that it can leverage the successes and challenges that previous countries have
faced in establishing a reasonable drug price scheme to inform its own policy.

138

Scott Introduce Landmark Legislation, supra note 109.
Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. §§ 2(b)(1), (2) (2019).
140
See generally Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019).
141
Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. §§ 1194(b)(2)(A)–(D) (2019)
(as introduced to Senate, Jan. 10, 2019 and passed by Senate, Dec. 12, 2019).
142
Rapfogel et al., supra note 128.
143
Alison Kodak, Poll: Americans Support Government Action To Curb Prescription Drug Prices,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/03/01/699086303/
poll-americans-support-government-action-to-curb-prescription-drug-prices.
144
See David Gross, et al., International Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, 15(3) HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 127, 127 (1994) (“Four European countries that have
research-based pharmaceutical industries—France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—have each
developed a set of government controls to limit the growth of prescription drug prices and expenditures.”).
139
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Since the United States is unique in its multi-payer healthcare system compared
to many developed economics including Canada, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Norway, and Australia,145 some critics are reluctant to compare the
controls implemented by single-payer countries, believing that such mechanisms
will not be adaptable for the United States.146 However, regardless of whether a
country utilizes a single-payer or a multi-payer health insurance system, the need
to determine how best to establish a reasonable drug price remains a constant.147
Specifically, governments must strike a balance between subjecting certain
drugs to a price cap to ensure affordability, while still incentivizing R&D.
In the past two decades, the United Kingdom, India, and Germany, three
distinct health care systems,148 have all attempted to reduce prescription drug
prices through legislation requiring that manufacturers sell prescription drugs at
reasonable prices.149 When first implementing a reasonable price strategy, the
United Kingdom, India, and Germany utilized different schemes to determine
what constitutes a reasonable price.150 The United Kingdom determined the
reasonable price of a drug through conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis,
during which time it is determined whether the economic value of the drug bares
a reasonable relation to the economic value it provides.151 India emphasized the
importance of the drug itself to increasing the health of the Indian population
and how much the manufacturer had invested in R&D.152 Germany implemented
a value-based system that required assessing the therapeutic value the drug
offers compared to similar drugs on the market, such as whether it has fewer

145
Ida Hellander, International Health Systems for Single Payer Advocates, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L
HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/single_payer_resources/international_health_systems_for_single_
payer_advocates.php.
146
See Megan McArdle, Why U.S. Health-Care Reformers Shouldn’t Use Other Countries as a Model.
Swiss Miss, Anyone, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2019).
147
In addition to the United States, Germany and France are multi-payer health systems, though highly
regulated by the government. Hellander, supra note 145.
148
The U.K. has a national health service in which medical systems are publicly owned and operated.
Germany has a highly government regulated multi-payer health insurance system in which universal health
insurance is available through government-funded or private insurance. Id. India has publicly financed health
insurance. Roosa Tikkanen et al., India: International Health Care System Profiles, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(June 5, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international-health-policy-center/countries/india?
redirect_source=/countries/india.
149
See generally U.K. Statutory Scheme, supra note 15; Padma, supra note 15; Kingham & Wheeler,
supra note 15.
150
See generally U.K. Statutory Scheme, supra note 15; Padma, supra note 15; Kingham & Wheeler,
supra note 15.
151
See e.g., Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority [2018] CAT 11 Nos: 1275–
1276/1/12/17, [¶¶ 255–275] (UK).
152
Ajay Prasad & Varsha Iyengar, Direct Price Control on Patented Drugs in India: The Probable Effects
on Innovation and Access to Medicines, 20 NAT. L. SCH. INDIA REV. 229, 233 (2008).
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side effects than other drugs or has higher success rates.153 In addition to
implementing policies that emphasized different key factors to determine
reasonability, the three schemes also differed as to which drugs were subjected
to reasonable price caps. At first the United Kingdom’s scheme only subjected
generic drugs to price caps leaving name brand drugs unregulated.154 India’s
scheme applied to drugs that were considered essential to the health of the
population.155 Germany’s scheme applied to only generic drugs and allowed
pharmaceutical companies to sell drugs under patent at any cost.156
Understanding the prescription drug regulatory landscape in the United
Kingdom, India, and Germany can help policy makers decide which current
policies present the most promise in reaching the desired goal of reducing drug
prices through implementing a reasonable drug pricing scheme.
A. United Kingdom’s Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme
The United Kingdom grants the government authority to impose price caps
on prescription drugs to deter companies from selling pharmaceuticals at
unreasonable prices.157 While at first only generic drugs were subject to price
regulations, the United Kingdom ultimately revised this scheme as companies
took advantage of the lack of price restrictions on patented drugs by making
small adjustments to former chemical compounds and increasing prices.158
In the past, the United Kingdom has had two main regulatory schemes to
control drug prices: the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) and
the Statutory Scheme for Pricing of Branded Medicines.159 The PPRS regulates
the profits manufacturers are allowed to make on their drug sales to the United
Kingdom Department of Health’s National Health Service (NHS), taking into
consideration the amount the company has invested into the drug’s R&D.160 The
scheme requires that manufacturers receive approval from the United Kingdom
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) before increasing a drug’s price
by showing that the manufacturer’s estimated profits fall below a certain level.161

153
Sophia Schlette & Rainer Hess, Early Benefit Assessment for Pharmaceuticals in Germany: Lessons
for Policy Makers, COMMONWEALTH FUND: ISSUES INT’L HEALTH POL’Y (2013).
154
U.K. Statutory Scheme, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3.10, 3.12, 3.14.
155
Prasad & Iyengar, supra note 152.
156
Schlette & Hess, supra note 153.
157
U.K. Statutory Scheme, supra note 15 ¶ 1.1.
158
Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority [2018] CAT 11 Nos: 1275–1276/1/12/17
[¶ 49] (UK).
159
Id. ¶¶ 37, 48.
160
Id. ¶ 38.
161
Department of Health & Social Care, The 2019 Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing and
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The Statutory Scheme regulates the maximum price of the drug itself and
therefore requires the government to determine a reasonable price to ensure drug
affordability while still incentivizing R&D.162
The PPRS was established in the 1970s and expired in 2019.163 The scheme
required that the DHSC determined whether the cost of a drug was excessive. 164
An excessive price occurred when the drug had no reasonable relation to the
economic value of the product supplied.165 The DHSC, with the assistance of the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (“NICE”),166 determined the
appropriate economic value by conducting a cost/effectiveness analysis and
comparing the price of the drug with that of similar drugs on the market.167 In
using the cost/effectiveness analysis, the U.K.’s NICE measured the ability for
the drug to extend and improve a patient’s life, known as quality adjusted life
years.168
Because the PPRS only applied to brand name drugs and did nothing to
regulate the price of generic drugs, the scheme led to manufacturers selling
generic versions at prices the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
considered excessive.169 Further, the PPRS gave the government no authority to
counteract the pharmaceutical companies’ actions.170 In Flynn Pharma Limited
v. Competition and Markets Authority, the U.K.’s Competition Appeal Tribunal
(CAT) declined to uphold a fine imposed by the CMA pursuant to excessive
drug prices.171 In 2013 the CMA began to investigate Pfizer, a drug
manufacturer, and Flynn, a drug supplier and marketer, after the price of the
epilepsy drug Epanutin increased by 2,600 percent.172 Finding that the
companies “abused their dominant positions in the narrowly defined markets for
manufacture and distribution” by excessively increasing their prices, the CMA
Access-Chapters and Glossary ¶¶ 5.17–5.21 (Dec. 2018).
162
Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority, ¶¶ 45–48 (UK).
163
Leela Barham, The UK’s New Medicines Pricing Deal – Opportunities and Risks For Pharma, PMLIVE
(May 10, 2019).
164
Understanding the 2014 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, THE ASS’N BRITISH PHARM. INDUS.
1 (2014).
165
Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority, ¶ 405 (UK).
166
In 1999, the UK established the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to assist
the NHS in drafting clinical guidelines and technology appraisals. Kingham & Wheeler, supra note 15 at 106.
167
Understanding the 2014 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, supra note 164, at 5.
168
Id.
169
See e.g., Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority, ¶ 4 (UK) (where the tribunal
declined to uphold a fine imposed on Flynn Pharma and Pfizer for selling their generic drug at an excessive
price).
170
See generally id.
171
Id.
172
Pfizer Fined for Hiking Epilepsy Drug Price 2,600%, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 7, 2016).
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fined Pfizer $84 million and Flynn nearly $7 million for charging the NHS unfair
prices for Epanutin.173 The CMA supported its decision to fine the companies
based on the fact that there was an absence of data to show that there was a
reasonable relation between the drug itself and its economic value.174 However,
in the CAT’s decision, the tribunal explained that the PPRS profit assessment,
which provides for a return on investment percentage, was not controlling, but
only a relevant factor to be examined.175 This ruling emphasized the importance
of subjecting all drugs to price regulation, not just name brand drugs.
Following the Flynn Pharma Limited ruling, the Health Service Medical
Supplies (“Costs”) Act removed the loophole which exempted generic
pharmaceutical companies from price control regulations.176 The legislation was
enacted after a CMA investigation found that pharmaceutical companies had
engaged in a practice of de-branding medicine to make it generic and therefore
no longer subject to the PPRS.177 The Costs Act allows the DHCS to request
pricing information for all drugs, whether generic or name brand, and gives the
Secretary of State the authority to determine the reasonable price for generic
drugs, which are exempt from the PPRS.178
In January 2019 the Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing and
Access (“Voluntary Scheme”) replaced the former PPRS, as the United
Kingdom recognized the need to subject a larger number of drugs to regulated
prices.179 Manufacturers and suppliers now have the choice of whether to
participate in the Voluntary Scheme or resort to the default Statutory Scheme.180
However, the United Kingdom has created the voluntary scheme with the aim
of having the majority of drug companies opting for this choice.181
Learning from the challenges the government faced with the former PPRS,
the Voluntary Scheme has a number of amendments. First, the Voluntary
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Id. ¶ 399.
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House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HC 1184, Price increases for generic medications,
(Oct. 2018) at ¶ 4.
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Id.
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Department of Health & Social Care, The 2019 Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing and
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Scheme applies to both generic and name brand drugs.182 Second, revisions were
made for how the United Kingdom should determine whether the market price
of the drug is reasonable.183 A key factor the United Kingdom must consider
when reviewing a drug price for its reasonableness is the “price of
therapeutically equivalent or comparable products[.]”184 In addition to
considering the cost of similar drugs already on the prescription drug market,
the scheme requires the government to analyze the clinical need for the drug, the
operational costs of production, and the “reasonableness” of other estimated
costs, including R&D, manufacturing, and supplying cost.185
The United States can leverage two lessons learned from the United
Kingdom. First, the United Kingdom’s use of assessing the therapeutic value
and cost-effectiveness of the drug when determining a reasonable price may
deter the pervasive practice of manufacturers setting drug prices that do not
reflect their clinical value.186 Second, the United Kingdom’s experience sheds
light on the importance of subjecting drugs under patent and generic to
mandatory price caps to deter pharmaceutical companies from making slight
altercations to evade the price regulations.
B. India’s Essential Medicine System
While the United Kingdom has implemented a voluntary scheme, India
emphasizes the R&D invested to form the drug when determining a reasonable
price.187 India’s heavy emphasis on R&D continues to incentivize the
pharmaceutical industry to innovate.188 Over the past five decades, India
experienced a stall in drug innovation due to its patent law.189 Before 2005 the
Indian government did not grant patents on medicines, which resulted in the
growth of generic drug manufacturing.190 Consequently, prescription drugs in
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India are very affordable, which increases access, but these tight regulations
have alienated pharmaceutical companies, resulting in less innovation.191
In 2005 India amended the Patent Act of 1970 to incentivize innovation.192
This amendment allowed for pharmaceutical products to receive patents, but
strictly limited drugs applicable to patent protection, excluding new forms of
known substances unless the new form enhanced efficacy or provided a new
use.193 The amendment required that any new pharmaceutical products were
“therapeutically more beneficial than earlier versions on which patents had
expired.”194 After the Indian government denied an exclusive patent to Novartis
for Glivec, a drug for the treatment of leukemia, litigation commenced regarding
the constitutionality of the amendment.195 In Novartis AG v. Union of India &
Others, the Supreme Court of India noted the importance of “strik[ing] a balance
between the need to promote research and development . . . [and] keep[ing]
private monopoly [of the drug market] at the minimum” and that it had been
reminded “that an error of judgment . . . will put life-saving drugs beyond the
reach of the multitude of ailing humanity[.]”196 The case ultimately turned on
whether Novartis could prove that its drug was effective.197 The court chose to
construe the term “effective” as narrowly as possible.198 Instead of requiring that
Novartis show that the individuals on the drug had higher success rates than
those not on the drug, the manufacturer had to provide evidence that the drug
was more effective than similar drugs already on the market.199 The court found
that because the drug was no more effective than others it could not qualify for
a patent.200
The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in Novartis is a win for affordable drug
costs.201 With fewer exclusive patents being issued, additional similar drugs can
enter the market, which ultimately drives down prescription costs.202 Yet, while
India has shown its ability to “counter the abuse of monopoly on a patented
191
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drug,” there is continuing concern that this success had led to poor R&D.203 In
an effort to spur innovation, particularly for the most severe illnesses, India
implemented a reasonable drug pricing scheme that heavily incentivizes
R&D.204
In 2013, following a change in patent policy, the Indian government
implemented the Drug Price Control Order (“Order”).205 The Order
implemented price ceilings for drugs deemed to be on the National List of
Essential Medicines (NLEM) following the recognition of a slight increase in
drug prices.206 The drugs on the list were deemed to be those “that satisfy the
primary health needs of the country’s population” and must be “made available
at all times in adequate quantities in the appropriate dosage forms to serve the
larger public interest.”207 Unfortunately, the Order allowed the government to
take into account the R&D costs of a drug when determining a reasonable price
ceiling but not the manufacturing costs.208 The price ceilings led to drug
companies making unreasonable profits once R&D had been recouped.209
Additionally, under the Order, the Indian government is unable to regulate the
price of drugs that are not on the essential drug list.210
To ensure patient access, it would be logical and practical that all
prescription drugs necessary for survival are sold at a reasonable price. Relying
solely on the NLEM has become problematic for those relying on new
medications because India’s essential drug list is not updated on a frequent
basis.211 However, the government has faced resistance from pharmaceutical
companies in an attempt to expand the list of covered drugs.212
203
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The United States can leverage multiple lessons from India’s change in drug
regulation policies from the past five decades. First, India highlights that a
diverse set of drugs should be subject to price caps, as subjecting only certain
drugs—such as those deemed to be essential—can lead to price hikes on other
drugs as pharmaceutical companies hope to make up for lost prices. Second, the
United States must strike a balance between weighing R&D investment too
heavily resulting in excess pharmaceutical profits while still incentivizing
investment in innovation. The latter is to ensure that new drugs continue to
launch in the U.S. market.
C. Germany’s Value-Based System
Unlike the United Kingdom’s voluntary scheme,213 and India’s current
system, which focuses on R&D investment in an effort to catalyze innovation
after a period of stagnation,214 Germany’s drug price reduction scheme is a
value-based system, where drug prices are determined according to the value
that they add to the market by either an increase in effectiveness or a decrease
in side effects when compared to drugs already on the market.215 However,
similar to the United Kingdom, Germany originally utilized a reference-based
pricing system, where new drugs were grouped with those drugs previously
existing on the market to determine a reasonable price.216 The original reference
system only applied to generic drugs and exempted patented products from price
caps.217 In 2011, Germany enacted the Act on the Reform of the Market for
Medical Products (Arzneimittelmarkt-Neuordnungsgesetz) (“AMNOG”) to
replace its statutory health insurance system which allowed pharmaceutical
manufacturers to set their own prices.218 The new structure was created in
response to increasing prices of brand name drugs.219
The AMNOG allows manufacturers to set their own initial launch price,
which remains consistent for the drug’s first year on the market.220 During this
time, the drug undergoes a benefit assessment.221 If a drug is found to have no
added benefit compared to other drugs on the market, which can be measured
213
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by whether the drug is more effective in treating the illness or results in fewer
side effects, the price of the drug is set in reference to the price of the
comparator.222 If a drug has added therapeutic benefit, a group of health insurer
representatives negotiate a price with the drug manufacturer.223 Relevant factors
for negotiation include the results of an additional benefit assessment, the cost
of other comparable pharmaceuticals, and prices paid in other European
countries.224 If no price is agreed upon, the drug price is established by an
arbitration panel comprised of representatives from each side, selected by the
manufacturer and the insurance agency.225 Following the arbitration panel, if the
manufacturer refuses to sell the drug at the arbitrator’s price, the drug is
withdrawn from the German market.226
The added benefit assessment allows for a drug to be categorized in one of
six potential levels. Level one is the major added benefit, which is for drugs that
offer “substantial improvement not previously achieved by the current standard
therapy.”227 Level two is the considerable added benefit, which is for drugs that
offer improvement over the comparator.228 Level three is for drugs with minor
added benefit, which is defined as drugs that offer a moderate improvement,
such as reducing non-serious symptoms of a disease.229 The next three levels are
added benefit present but not quantifiable; no added benefit has been proven;
and lower benefit than the comparator.230 The Federal Joint Committee, a body
comprised of payers, providers, and patient representatives, performs the
assessment upon the manufacture’s required submission of clinical reports.231
The new scheme has had mixed results. From 2011 to 2019, of 230 new
drugs introduced, twenty-eight were withdrawn from the market in Germany,
but are still sold elsewhere.232 Additionally, because Germany is often used as a
reference country in reference-based pricing schemes, manufacturers fear that a
price reduction in Germany may carry over to price reductions in other countries
as well.233
222
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The downfalls of Germany’s reasonable pricing scheme reveal the
importance of not relying solely on a value-based system to determine price
reasonability. A reasonable drug price analysis requires the consideration of
R&D costs and manufacturing prices. This will ensure that pharmaceutical
companies are not alienated, which may result in companies withdrawing drugs
from the market.
The new regulations set in the United Kingdom, India, and Germany have
had mixed results at reducing drug prices, with unexpected consequences arising
as manufacturers began exploiting loopholes within the regulations.234
Analyzing the successes and failures of previously implemented schemes can
reveal certain loopholes in the current U.S. proposals that aim to establish a
reasonable drug price scheme.
IV. LEVERAGING LESSONS LEARNED FOR A REASONABLE DRUG PRICE
SCHEME IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States should leverage the lessons learned from the United
Kingdom, India, and Germany to determine potential weaknesses with current
drug pricing proposals. Specifically, the United States can determine whether
the price factors laid out in each policy are best for analyzing price reasonability
and which drugs should be subject to reasonable prices. Identifying the best
factors to consider when determining a reasonable drug price and which drugs
to subject to mandatory price caps will allow the United States to ensure that
prescription drugs are affordable while not alienating pharmaceutical
companies.
The Price Relief Act relies heavily on a reference-based system, in which
the price of the drug is determined by comparing the manufacturing price for the
drug in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan.235 Under the
Price Relief Act, an assessment of the drug’s value would only be required if the
price data in more than three of the reference countries were unavailable.236
However, of concern is the fact that the R&D costs are not included in such an
analysis, unless the price is already determined to not be excessive through the
reference-based analysis, which may lead to a stagnation in the development of
new drugs.237 Combining the use of the Price Relief Act reference-based system
with a value-based system, like that in Germany, would better incentivize the
234
235
236
237
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pharmaceutical industry to use R&D costs to enhance the efficacy of the drug,
thereby increasing its value.238 Such an approach would require the government
to negotiate drug prices while still reassuring the pharmaceutical industry that
R&D costs can be recouped. If the United States were to require manufacturers
to submit data on the costs associated with making the drugs, the United states
could use this data to determine a reasonable price. For example, in India,
pharmaceutical profits were highly inflated because while R&D was considered
in determining a reasonable price, the low manufacturing cost of the drug was
not. This proposal would prevent such an issue from repeating itself.239
While the Price Relief Act emphasizes a reference-based system, the
ADMA, emphasizes the R&D investment and the manufacturing and operating
costs to produce the drug, similar to the reasonable pricing scheme in India.240
However, there is no reference-based scheme that the government can use to
compare the price of the drug sold in the United States to similar foreign
economies.241 Additionally, the legislation introduces no value-based system,
where the therapeutic value that the drug adds to the market compared to
previously introduced similar drugs is considered, potentially limiting the
incentive to innovate more effective drugs.242
On the other hand, the We PAID Act utilizes a reference-based pricing
system by using a framework that compares the price of similar drugs in other
countries, but using price comparison as one of many factors.243 Additionally,
like the pricing scheme in India, the We PAID Act also requires considering the
amount of R&D costs that the company has invested.244 However, the We PAID
Act makes no mention of considering the value of the drug for determining its
reasonable price.245 The absence of such a factor disincentivizes companies from
producing new drugs that are more effective than those already on the market.
Also, the Pricing Reduction Act makes no mention of ensuring that drugs are
sold at a reasonable price and only requires that any price hikes on drugs do not
exceed the rate of inflation.246 Though this may help stabilize prices, it will have
no effect on the initial price of the drug.
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The We PAID Act, the Pricing Reduction Act, and the Price Relief Act all
only require a select few drugs to be regulated, which results in many drugs
exempt from the legislations’ purview.247 The We PAID Act is only applicable
to those drugs with R&D costs financed through federal funds.248 The Pricing
Reduction Act is only applicable to those drugs covered by Medicare Part D.249
The Price Relief Act is only applicable to name brand drugs and does not
regulate generic versions.250 Such an approach may lead to an increase of
manufacturers discontinuing development of drugs, not launching them in
certain countries, or launching them at a slower rate.251 Learning from the
challenges India faced, it is therefore critical that all approved drugs are subject
to reasonable prices, that manufacturers of both generic and name brand drugs
abide by new regulations, and that manufacturers are still incentivized to launch
in the United States.
Combining the schemes in the United Kingdom and Germany, the Lower
Drug Costs Now Act uses a mixture of reference-based pricing and value-based
pricing to determine the drug’s reasonable price.252 The reference-based pricing
system will ensure that the prescription drug prices in the United States do not
far exceed those in other developed countries. Additionally, considering the
therapeutic value the drug adds to the market when determining whether its price
is reasonable aims to incentivize manufacturers to produce innovative drugs
rather than engage in the practice of making small chemical compound changes
to existing drugs. The use of reference-based pricing can seek to deter
pharmaceutical companies from dropping out of the United States market, as
seen with Germany’s value-based system, by ensuring that the price sold will
not drop below the average price level of the drug in Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.253 Additionally, similar to the revised
scheme in the United Kingdom which subjects both name brand and generics to
reasonable prices,254 the Lower Drug Costs Now Act circumvents the issue of
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manufacturers imposing price hikes by including the 250 most expensive drugs,
regardless of whether the drug is generic or name brand.255 Moreover, allowing
HHS to negotiate the sale price of drugs on behalf of Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries, but requiring that the same price be offered to those with private
insurance, seeks to prevent manufacturers from recouping potential lost profits
by hiking prices for drugs not covered by federally funded programs. 256
CONCLUSION
Among the most discussed proposals currently in Congress, the Lower Drug
Costs Now Act is the most promising in leveraging lessons learned from the
United Kingdom, India, and Germany in regulating drug prices through
imposing a reasonable drug price scheme. The Act combines the U.K.’s costeffectiveness pricing system257 and Germany’s value-based system258 in
determining what constitutes a reasonable price, while still requiring that the
pharmaceutical company’s R&D investment costs are considered to not alienate
the pharmaceutical industry, which may result in drug products being withdrawn
from the market.259 The Lower Drug Costs Now Act also subjects a diverse set
of drugs within its purview by regulating both drugs with patent protections and
generic drugs and by requiring the same reasonable prices apply uniformly
rather than only applying to drugs purchased by federal or state-funded health
care programs.260 The United States must act to reduce the continuing increase
in prescription drug prices to ensure that Americans remain healthy.261
Legislation passed in the past four decades has proven ineffective in its goal of
reducing prescription drug costs for American consumers through increasing the
number of generic drugs entering the market and increasing the number of
individuals with health insurance. This is evidenced by the fact that many
individuals continue to struggle to afford the medications that they need.262
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Implementing the reasonable drug price scheme in the Lower Drug Costs Now
Act will begin to lower prescription drug costs and promote the health and wellbeing that Americans deserve.
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